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Abstract
I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their
resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous
effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of the advertis-
ing candidate in that issue and it makes the issue more salient, thereby increasing the issue’s perceived
importance to the voters. Whether a candidate can increase his vote share during the contest depends
on the interplay of strategic issue selection, which depends on candidates’ comparative advantages,
and the aggregate resource allocation to the issues. The aggregate resource allocation—or campaign
agenda—depends on an issue’s importance, the firmness of voters’ conviction regarding candidates’
relative quality, and the divisiveness of this issue. A candidate increases his vote share during the cam-
paign contest if he has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives more aggregate spending.
Consequently, the contest may be biased in one candidate’s favor and an a priori less popular candidate
might be the actual odds on favorite. I show that a relatively unimportant issue might receive most
aggregate spending and thus could decide the election.
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1 Introduction
There is an election between two candidates upcoming and Candidate 1 is currently more popular in
the polls than Candidate 2, leading with 5 percentage points over his opponent. Both candidates have
identical campaign budgets and employ their funds with equal efficiency. There are no shocks to voters’
preferences and there is no randomness in the campaign. Can we then conclude that Candidate 1 is
going to win the election? In this paper I show that the answer to that question is “no.” The reason for
this is that campaign contests are often biased in one candidate’s favor; they benefit the candidate who
has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives the greatest amount of campaign spending. If a
candidate trails his opponent by not too great a margin at the outset of the campaign contest, he thus
could be likely to come out ahead on Election Day.
Political campaigns in many western democracies are often best described as contests in which can-
didates and political parties spend significant amounts of time and money—or effort—in an attempt to
influence voters’ decisions at the ballot. The prime example is the US, where spending during these
campaign contests by the two main candidates during presidential elections has experienced an average
growth rate of 24.6 per cent between campaigns over the period from 1984 to 2016 and has reached a
maximum of more than $1.2 billion in 2012.1 Candidates allocate these funds over multiple policy issues
and how issues are strategically targeted matters for electoral outcomes.2 Nevertheless, the vast majority
of the literature studying campaign contests focusses on one-dimensional campaigns in which campaign
spending creates valence.3 Another important strand of literature studies multi-dimensional campaign
contests where candidates compete through issue strategic selection.4 In this class of models, the func-
tion of campaigning is to prime issues, i.e., to strategically manipulate which issues the voters consider
important on Election Day. Both of these approaches have led to a series of interesting results and have
deepened our understanding of how campaign contests are fought and what consequences they have. But,
taken in isolation, they also have significant shortcomings. For example, Kaplan et al. (2006) criticize
the state of the theoretical literature studying strategic issue selection by stating that “[i]ssue ownership
theory clearly requires further development before it can systematically help us understand campaigns” (p.
735).
In the current paper I combine features of these two approaches to political campaigns to further our
understanding of their workings and consequences. There are two candidates competing in a campaign
contest and who need to decide how to allocate their campaign resources to the different policy issues.
Campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects: it persuades the voters of the issue specific quality
of the advertising candidate, and it primes the issue, thereby manipulating voters’ issue importance
ranking. Persuasion is similar to creating issue specific valence and hence relates to the literature on
1Calculated using data from https://www.fec.gov/data/. Recent studies point to the importance of campaign contests,
see for example Erikson and Palfrey (1998, 2000) or Franz and Ridout (2007, 2010).
2Kang et al. (2018), Arbour (2014), Be´langer and Meguid (2008), Kaplan et al. (2006), or Sigelman and Buell (2004)
show that spending is distributed over a whole range of important issues in the US, while Wagner and Meyer (2014),
Meyer and Wagner (2016), or Dolezal et al. (2014) show the same for campaigns in Europe.
3E.g. Snyder (1989), Erikson and Palfrey (2000), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009),
Meirowitz (2008), Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2012, 2013), Denter and Sisak (2015), or Balart et al. (2018).
4E.g. Petrocik (1996), Riker (1996), Amoro´s and Puy (2013), Aragone`s et al. (2015), Egorov (2015), or Dragu and Fan
(2016).
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endogenous valence, while priming relates to the literature studying strategic issue selection. Voters
are heterogeneous in their candidate evaluations and may also differ in their issue importance weights.
Candidates choose an allocation of their budgets that maximizes their respective vote shares.
Combining the two existing approaches generates many testable predictions. In particular:
• The candidate with a comparative advantage spends more on an issue than his contender.
• An issue receives ceteris paribus more aggregate spending if it is more important, less divisive, or if
voters have generally no strict opinion about candidates’ relative qualities on the issue.
• A candidate increases his electoral support during the campaign contest, if he has a comparative
advantage on the issue on which candidates campaign with greater intensity. As a consequence,
campaign contests often structurally benefit one candidate over the other.
• An a priori weaker candidate could be the actual favourite on Election Day, once the campaign
contest is taken into account.
The first result shows that results from Aragone`s et al. (2015) and Amoro´s and Puy (2013) remain
valid even though the framework was changed significantly by allowing for persuasion. However, as we
will see later, the current model leads to a more nuanced version of this result as it may happen in interior
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Therefore, unlike in the literature so far, both candidates may campaign
on all issues. The second result follows from a contest theoretic logic and while I am not aware of a
similar result in the literature, the underlying intuitions are familiar from other contexts (see for example
Konrad, 2009, for an overview). Finally, the two remaining results are, to the best of my knowledge,
novel.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section places the paper in the context of the
relevant literature. The next section discusses how campaign contests are likely to affect voters’ attitudes
towards candidates. Section 3 introduces a model of campaign contests, and Section 4 studies equilibrium
campaigning. Section 5 derives implications of campaign contests for candidate selection on Election Day
and for optimal candidate nomination. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Related Literature. As mentioned before, the paper combines features from two different literatures
and thus contributes to both. First, the paper contributes to the extensive literature studying competitive
vote buying/endogenous valence, for example Snyder (1989), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Herrera et al.
(2008), Dahm and Porteiro (2008), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Denter and Sisak (2015),
Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2012, 2013), Boyer et al. (2017), Balart et al. (2018), or Casas (2018). In con-
trast to these papers, I study the allocation of a campaign budget over different issues with the additional
twist that campaigning primes issues. Thus, the paper also contributes to the literature studying strate-
gic issue selection when campaign on an issue primes it, for example Petrocik (1996), Riker (1996),
Amoro´s and Puy (2013), Aragone`s et al. (2015), or Dragu and Fan (2016). The current paper innovates
by introducing persuasion: the way voters evaluate candidates is determined endogenously during the
campaign contest. In this literature candidates never campaign on the same set of issues in equilibrium.
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Empirical research, however, refutes this conclusion, as some form of “convergence” on the issues is the
norm rather than the exception:5 “[T]here is no shortage of explanations for why issue convergence is
such a rare commodity in American campaigns. Perhaps surprisingly, though, there is a shortage of con-
vincing evidence that issue convergence really is a rare commodity.” (Sigelman and Buell, 2004, p. 651)
The model presented in the current paper allows for imperfect convergence and is thus a step forward in
reconciling theory and data.
The model I develop is a form of a Blotto game. A Blotto game is a situation in which players allocate
resources to a number of different contests (here issues), and typically the player spending most on a
certain contest wins it for sure. Papers contributing to this literature are the classical treatise of Borel
(1953), Shubik and Weber (1981), Roberson (2006), Chowdhury et al. (2013), Kovenock and Roberson
(2011), or Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2012). The current paper differs because the value of a
battlefield is determined endogenously, as an issue’s importance increase in aggregate spending directed to
it. Moreover, unlike in these papers, in the current paper success on individual battle fields—or issues—is
not modelled as all-pay auctions but as a smooth function of campaign spending.
While the above literature studied non-informative campaigns, some papers focus on candidates’ in-
centives to provide information during campaign contests. Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) study how parties
release information regarding a payoff relevant state variable over time and Alonso and Caˆmara (2016)
or Denter et al. (2019) study how an incumbent politician may design policy experiments to influence
voters’ decision at the ballot. Polborn and Yi (2006) study informative positive and negative campaign-
ing. In all these papers the policy space is one-dimensional and thus, unlike in the current paper, issue
selection as well as issue priming cannot play a role. Egorov (2015) and Basu and Knowles (2018) study
informative campaigning with two-dimensional policy spaces. Egorov (2015) studies the incentives of an
incumbent and a challenger to campaign either on the first or on the second issue in a model in which
campaigning directly reveals information about a candidate’s competence and when issue selection also
signals information regarding one’s competence on the issue one does not campaign on. In contrast to
his paper, in Basu and Knowles (2018) candidates can campaign on both issues at once, but drop they
the assumption that voters may draw inference about a candidate’s competence also from issue selection.
As in the current paper, both Egorov (2015) and Basu and Knowles (2018) show that candidates may
choose to campaign on the same issues in equilibrium. However, unlike in the current paper, in their
papers campaigning does not prime policy issues, which creates the strict incentive found in the literature
to campaign on different issues in the first place. Moreover, in contrast to these papers, in the current
paper neither candidates nor voters are restricted in the sense that they can only campaign on or observe
campaign spending on one policy issue. Finally, none of these papers studies the political consequences
of the campaign contest for candidate selection on Election Day.
2 Effects of Campaigning: Priming and Persuasion
Given the multi-dimensionality of campaign contests, there are two distinct ways in which they may
affect voters. First, campaigns could have an across-issues dimension and may change how voters view
5Other papers coming to similar conclusion include Kaplan et al. (2006), Green and Hobolt (2008), or Damore (2005).
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the different issues. In particular, campaigns may change how voters prioritize issues or which weights
voters attach to the different issues. Second, there may be a within-issue dimension as well. That is,
candidates’ campaigning on a given issue could change the way voters see candidates’ qualities on that
issue. This distinction between across- and within-issue effects is similar to the distinction used by Bartels
(2006), who differentiates between priming and persuasion. We will follow Bartels by referring to the
different effects of campaigning in the same way. In the remainder of this section I discuss how persuasion
and priming are likely to change voters’ attitudes.
Priming. The fact that priming an issue can raise this issue’s importance relative to other issues is well
known in political science, see for example Bartels (2006) or Aragone`s et al. (2015) and the respective
references provided therein. This effect has its roots in cognitive psychology. Priming is a cognitive
process that activates accessible categories in the mind of a person. Exposure to a stimulus makes the
related categories of the stimulus easier accessible and the categories become more important in the mind
of individuals. Smith and Mackie (2007) put it like this: “[. . . ] anything that brings an idea to mind–
even coincidental, irrelevant events–can make it accessible and influence our interpretation of behavior”
(p. 67). In the specific example of a political campaign, priming makes an issue more salient and thus
individuals evaluate the issue as more relevant for making decisions (see Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, or
Weaver, 2007). Priming is hence closely related to the theory of agenda setting (see for example the
discussion in Willnat, 1997). In deciding between alternatives, the primed issue is still in the memory and
becomes more important. Priming can therefore “alter the standards by which people evaluate election
candidates” (Severin and Tankard, 1997). In the sequel I will assume that campaigning on an issue
increases this issue’s relative importance and decreases the importance of the other issues.
Persuasion. There are many reasons to suspect that campaigning changes how voters view candidates
conditionally on an issue. One simple reason could be that campaigning provides information regarding
policy platforms. If voters are risk averse, this will on average increase the advertising candidate’s issue
specific evaluation as uncertainty is reduced. Similarly, issue specific political persuasion tends to improve
how voters esteem a certain candidate on that issue. Persuasion could take the form of providing costly
evidence of a candidate’s issue specific valence, for example by highlighting a candidate’s professional
background as a business leader or veteran. Skaperdas and Vaidya (2012) study this kind of persuasion.
Similarly, persuasion may take the form of Bayesian persuasion as pioneered by Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). An application of this model to political persuasion is for example Alonso and Caˆmara (2016).
In both cases, campaigning on an issue will at least in expectation improve a candidate’s assessment on
that issue.
Finally, there is reason to expect a positive persuasion effect of campaigning based on what psychol-
ogists call the mere-exposure effect. According to this effect “repeated exposure to an object results in
greater attraction to that object” (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 170), because it creates familiarity. The
effect was first systematically described by Zajonc (1968) and there is ample evidence of its importance for
human attitudes, see for example Bornstein (1989), Tom et al. (2007), Moon et al. (2009), or Fang et al.
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(2007).6 The importance of the mere-exposure effect for advertising is well-established, see for example
Yoo (2008) or Lee et al. (2015). Moreover, Moorthy and Hawkins (2005) show that mere repetition of an
ad increases a products perceived quality.
There are sufficient reasons to believe that persuasion effects are relevant and that voters esteem a
candidate more if the candidate campaigns on the issue. In the following I will assume that by campaigning
on an issue a candidate indeed increases his perceived quality.
3 Campaign Contests
In this section I introduce a theoretical model of campaign contests. Two politicians j ∈ {D,R} compete
in a campaign for a political office by exerting effort. While effort could mean many different things, for
specificity I stick to the interpretation of buying TV advertising. There is a measure-one continuum of
voters, indexed by v. Voters care about 2 policy issues indexed by i.7 They assign to each candidate a
relative quality belief θiv,j ∈ (0, 1), where relative quality is defined in a way such that θ
i
v,D + θ
i
v,R = 1. It
is useful to define θiv,D ≡ θ
i
v and θ
i
v,R ≡ 1− θ
i
v and work with this convention in the following. To assess
the overall relative quality of a politician, voters assign a weight ϕv ∈ (0, 1) to issue 1 and 1−ϕv to issue
2. Voters’ assessments of candidates’ relative quality on issue i are distributed on Θi = [θi, θ
i
] ⊂ (0, 1).
Similarly, issue importance assessments are distributed on Ω = [ϕ,ϕ] ⊂ (0, 1). Every voter v is hence
completely described by sv ∈ S ≡ Θ
1 × Θ2 × Ω. Voters’ assessments of candidates and issues are
uncorrelated with respective marginal distributions I i(ϕiv) and C
i(θiv).
Following the literature, voters are assumed to have weighted issue preferences (e.g. Krasa and Polborn,
2010) and evaluate candidates as follows:
uD(x, sv) = c(x
1, θ1v)w(x, ϕv) + c(x
2, θ2v)(1− w(x, ϕv)),
uR(x, sv) = (1− c(x
1, θ1v))w(x, ϕv) + (1− c(x
2, θ2v))(1 −w(x, ϕv)),
(1)
where c(xi, θiv) ∈ [0, 1] is voter v’s evaluation of Candidate D’s relative quality on issue i, taking into
account campaign spending xi ≡ (xiD, x
i
R) and the initial evaluation θ
i
v. Similarly, w(x, ϕv) ∈ [0, 1] is
the voter’s evaluation of the importance of issue 1, depending on campaign spending x ≡ (x1,x2) and
the initial evaluation ϕv . It follows that when uD(x, sv) >
1
2 , voter v prefers D over R, and vice versa if
uD(x, sv) <
1
2 . Moreover, uR(x, sv) = 1− uD(x, sv).
Campaigning has the two simultaneous effects described before, persuasion and priming. Persuasion
implies that the assessment of a candidate’s quality is improving in the number of published TV ads,
xij . Priming leads to a reassessment of issues’ relative importance. We assume the following priming
technology:
Assumption 1. Campaigning changes a voter’s beliefs about issues’ relative importance in the following
way:
w(x, ϕv) = max
{
min
{
ϕv + η
(
g
(
x1D + x
1
R
)
− g
(
x2D + x
2
R
))
, 1
}
, 0
}
(2)
6Interestingly, the mere-exposure effect also has a significant impact on how researchers value the quality of different
academic journals (Serenko and Bontis, 2011).
7Most of the analysis in Section 4 can be readily extended to any number of issues n ≥ 2.
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for g(0) = 0, g′(x) > 0, g′′(x) ≤ 0, and η ≥ 0.
Spending on an issue increases that issue’s relative importance and decreases the importance of all
other issues. η is a parameter that measures the overall effectiveness of priming and will be useful for
comparative statics.8
Voter v’s after-campaigning assessment of candidates’ relative quality on issue i is c(xi, θiv). I assume
the following persuasion technology:
Assumption 2. c(xi, θiv) ∈ [0, 1] is C
2 in all arguments and has the following properties:
1. Concavity: c(xi, θiv) is strictly concave and increasing in x
i
D and strictly convex and decreasing in
xiR.
2. Symmetry: c(x, y, θiv) = 1− c(y, x, 1 − θ
i
v).
3. Neutrality: c(x, x, θiv) = θ
i
v.
As in the case of priming, the technology may differ from issue to issue. Assumption 2 is very similar
to what Dixit (1987) or Hoffmann and Rota-Graziosi (2012) impose on contest success functions. Each
player’s effort has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his issue specific relative evaluation.
c(xi, θi) is symmetric in the sense that if we exchange candidates’ efforts and initial evaluations, we also
exchange their post campaigning evaluation. Moreover, if both choose the same level of effort on issue
i, their relative evaluation is unchanged; efforts neutralize each other. Throughout most of the analysis,
that is with the exception of Section 4.1 and some examples, I will impose another assumption, namely
that the first unit of persuasive effort is very effective, limxij→0
∂c(xi,θiv)
∂xij
= +∞. This assumption precludes
the existence of corner equilibria, which are not the focus of this paper, and makes the analysis slightly
more convenient.
Lemma 1 in Appendix A.4 shows that Assumption 2 implies that given a symmetric spending profile
on issue i, xiD = x
i
R, the marginal impact of campaign spending on candidates’ relative evaluation depends
on voter v’s initial assessment through θiv(1 − θ
i
v), which one can interpret as a measure of the voter’s
decidedness on issue i. Throughout the analysis I will assume that in such a situation it is weakly easier
to influence a voter who is undecided than a voter who has a clear favorite on issue i:
Assumption 3. The marginal impact of campaign spending on a voter’s relative evaluation of candidates
on issue i is weakly increasing in a voter’s undecidedness θiv(1 − θ
i
v). Formally,
∂2c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∂θiv
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
≥ 0 if
θiv ≤
1
2 , and
∂2c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∂θiv
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
≤ 0 else.
Starting at θiv =
1
2 , when θ
i
v gets closer to zero or one, the effectiveness of campaigning does not
increase. Thus, the assumption formalizes the words of Festinger et al. (1956): “A man with a conviction
is a hard man to change.” A similar assumption is made explicit in a recent paper by Balart et al.
(2018), where the effectiveness of campaign spending depends on and decreases in platform polarization.
8Voters usually care about all issues to some degree, as ϕiv ∈ (0, 1).
6
Similarly, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) show that if voters have concave policy utility, the
marginal effectiveness of campaign spending decreases in policy divergence. θiv(1− θ
i
v) can be interpreted
as a measure of policy divergence, where θiv(1− θ
i
v) =
1
4 implies candidates choose the same platforms on
issue i and therefore candidates convergence completely.9
We need one final assumption to facilitate the analysis. Given Assumptions 2 and 3, it is not guaranteed
that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists even when η = 0, that is when the game becomes a standard
contest with exogenous prizes or weights. The next assumption constrains the magnitude of the cross
derivatives of ci and is sufficient to guarantee this:
Assumption 4. For all xi ∈ [0, B]2 and for all θi ∈ (0, 1),
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
>
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD∂x
i
R
>
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiR)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
.
Assumptions 2 to 4 define something that in other contexts is often called a contest success func-
tion, see for example Skaperdas (1996). Most standard contest success functions are special cases of
c(xi, θiv), for example the generalized logit, or Tullock, contest success function studied by Snyder (1989),
Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Balart et al. (2018), or Bouton et al. (2018),
or the tournament model with potential head starts studied by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Herrera et al.
(2008), or Denter and Sisak (2015).10
Voting is probabilistic and the probability that a voter casts her ballot for candidate j is uj(x, sv).
Campaign spending has no immediate marginal costs but candidates are endowed with a use-it-or-lose-it
budget B > 0 that they can distributed over the different issues. Since it is always beneficial to increase
spending on one of the two issues, in equilibrium the budget constraint needs to hold with equality, and
hence x2j = B − x
1
j . Candidates maximize their vote share and their respective maximization problems
are then as follows:
max
x1
D
∈[0,B]
πD(x) =
∫ ∫ ∫
S
[
c(x1, θ1v)w(x, ϕv) + c(x
2, θ2v) (1 − w(x, ϕv))
]
dC1(θ1v)dC
2(θ2v)dI(ϕv)
= E
[
c(x1, θ1v)w(x, ϕv) + c(x
2, θ2v) (1 − w(x, ϕv))
]
max
x1
R
∈[0,B]
πR(x) =
∫ ∫ ∫
S
[
(1− c(x1, θ1v))w(x, ϕv) + (1− c(x
2, θ2v)) (1 − w(x, ϕv))
]
dC1(θ1v)dC
2(θ2v)dI(ϕv)
= E
[
(1− c(x1, θ1v))w(x, ϕv) + (1− c(x
2, θ2v)) (1 − w(x, ϕv))
]
E[·] is the expectation operator. The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium.
9 For example, assume θiv =
1
2
(
1− (biv − p
i
D)
2 + (biv − p
i
R)
2
)
∈ [0, 1], where the policy space is [0, 1], biv ∈ [0, 1] is voter
v’s ideal point on issue i and pij ∈ [0, 1] is candidate j’s policy platform on that issue. Let p
i
D = p
i + ǫ and piR = p
i
− ǫ for
appropriately chosen ǫ, which can be interpreted as a measure of platform convergence and when ǫ = 0 candidates choose
the same platforms and thus converge perfectly. Then θiv(1− θ
i
v) decreases in platform polarization ǫ.
10In tournament models Assumption 4 holds only when the variance of the additive noise variable is sufficiently large, as
otherwise the marginal impact of campaign spending becomes zero at one point.
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4 Equilibrium Campaigning
We now study equilibrium behavior by both candidates in the campaign contest. To derive intuitions
for how the two main effects of campaigning influence candidates’ incentives, I begin with an analysis of
the two effects in isolation. That is, I first study behavior in a campaign contest when campaigning only
persuades but leaves issues’ relative importance unchanged, and then I continue by studying the other
polar case, i.e., a campaign contest that only primes issues but does not persuade voters. As we will see,
the two effects have very different consequences for equilibrium campaigning, and these differences relate
to comparative advantages, which I define as follows:
Definition 1 (Comparative Advantage). Let
σi ≡ E
[
θiv
]
− θ¯,
where θ¯ ≡ 12E
[
θ1v + θ
2
v
]
. Candidate D has a comparative advantage on issue i if σi > 0. If σi < 0,
Candidate R has a comparative advantage in i and if σi = 0, no candidate has a comparative advantage
on that issue.
By the nature of comparative advantages, it is not possible that one candidate has a comparative
advantage on all issues. This follows directly from σ1 + σ2 = 0. In particular, either every candidate has
exactly one comparative advantage or no candidate has a comparative advantage. For example, in the
simplest case with a single voter comparative advantage boils down to a comparison of θ1 and θ2. For
example, if θ1 = 0.8 and θ2 = 0.6, D has an absolute advantage on all issues and a comparative advantage
on issue 1.
4.1 Two Polar Benchmarks
To motivate the study of an integrated model with both priming and persuasion, I now study both effects
in isolation. Hence, I now study a campaign contest that either only primes or only persuades. This will
deliver two important benchmarks and shows why an integrated model with both effects is necessary to
generate the results of this paper.
First, consider a situation in which campaigning only persuades, i.e., where η = 0. Then:
Proposition 1. Let η = 0. The campaign contest has a unique interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
in which candidates converge completely, i.e., they spend the same amount on all issues i, xiD = x
i
R = x
i.
Thus, without priming there is complete convergence in the campaign contest. In this case the game
is a version of a Blotto, or divide-the-dollar, model. This kind of models has been used to model electoral
competition before, for example by Myerson (1993), Laslier and Picard (2002), or Boyer et al. (2017). In
this class of models pure strategy Nash equilibria typically do not exist.11 To the contrary, Proposition 1
states that only a pure strategy equilibrium exists. The reason is that the current model is a stochastic
version of a Blotto game, where the value of each ‘battle field’—or issue—is not either zero or one but a
11An exception is Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2012).
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continuously changing function of campaign spending. This produces the result that candidates converge
completely by spending the exact same amount on all issues.
Next, consider a situation in which campaigning only primes issues:
Proposition 2. Let η > 0 and c(xi, θiv) = θ
i
v for all x
i ∈ [0, B]2. If candidates have comparative
advantages, the campaign contest has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each candidate spends all of his
budget on the issue where he has the comparative advantage. Therefore, candidates diverge completely,
i.e., they spend never campaign on the same issue i, xiD · x
i
R = 0. When candidates have no comparative
advantage, any spending profile (x1D, x
1
R) ∈ [0, B]
2 is an equilibrium.
If campaigning does not persuade, the campaign contest is a version of the models studied by
Amoro´s and Puy (2013), Aragone`s et al. (2015), or Dragu and Fan (2016), and candidates behave sim-
ilarly in equilibrium. For example, Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1 of Aragone`s et al. (2015),
which states that “[...] each party concentrates all its campaigning time on the issue in which it has the
largest quality advantage.” In their paper, absolute advantages imply also comparative advantages, as
every candidate has exactly one absolute advantage. Proposition 2 makes the importance of comparative
advantage explicit, as does the analysis of for example Amoro´s and Puy (2013). Their conclusions and
the conclusion of Proposition 2 are also in line with what Riker (1996) coined the Dominance Principle in
political campaigns.12 Generally, when there are comparative advantages candidates completely diverge
in equilibrium. Hence, priming leads to the exact opposite incentives as persuasion.
Persuasion leads candidates to adopt identical strategies and they will converge completely in any
equilibrium. Priming has the opposite effect and in isolation leads candidates to diverge perfectly. Both
are extreme predictions and fail to explain the empirical evidence that was mentioned in the introduction.
In particular, Sigelman and Buell (2004) showed that imperfect convergence is the best description of
observed campaigning behavior and that one candidate tends to spend more on a certain subset of issues
and less on the remaining ones. As I will explore in the sequel, an integrated model with both priming
and persuasion can rationalize such behavior.
4.2 An Integrated Model
In this section I now turn to study the integrated model that allows both effects to be present in a
campaign contest. The following proposition establishes that an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists:
Proposition 3. The game has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there exists η¯ > 0
such that for all η ∈ [0, η¯] the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
The proposition shows the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the campaign contest, even
interior equilibria. Thus, adding persuasion to a standard priming model may qualitatively change the
campaign contest’s equilibrium in an important way. Of course, the assumption of an infinite marginal
product of persuasion is therefore not necessary; it suffices that the first unit of persuasion is sufficiently
12Riker (1996) defines it as follows: “When one side has an advantage on an issue, the other side ignores it.” (Riker, 1996,
p. 106).
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effective. If additionally η is sufficiently small, the campaign contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. The
exact values η may take on depend on the details of the game. The following example shows that η need
not be really close to zero and that priming can be quite effective:
Example 1: Assume that B = 1 and that
w(x, ϕ) = max
{
min
{
ϕ+ η
(
x1D + x
1
R − x
2
D − x
2
R
)
, 1
}
, 0
}
as well as
c(xi, θi) = max
{
min
{
θi + κ
(
(xiD −
1
2
(xiD)
2)− (xiR −
1
2
(xiR)
2)
)
, 1
}
, 0
}
.
for some κ > 0 and η > 0. Moreover, let θ
i
+ κ2 < 1, θ
i − κ2 > 0, ϕ + 2η < 1, ϕ − 2η > 0.
13 The
individual decision problems of the candidates are strictly concave and the campaign contest has a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. For large enough κ, the equilibrium is interior, i.e., xij ∈ (0, 1).
The proofs to all the examples in the paper can be found in Appendix B. Note that the assumptions
in the example define an upper boundary η¯ = min
{
1−ϕ
2 ,
ϕ
2
}
≤ 14 for η. Whenever, η < η¯, the campaign
contest has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
4.2.1 Issue Selection: Convergence or Divergence?
I now begin with the analysis of equilibrium campaigning. In a first step I focus on strategic issue selection,
that is with which intensity the two candidates campaign on an issue and which candidate outs greater
emphasis on a given issue. As we will see in Section 5, strategic issue selection is an important determinant
of candidate selection on Election Day. Therefore, it is important to understand what determines strategic
issue selection by the candidates.
In an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium behavior follows from the set of first order conditions
(henceforth FOCs):
∂πD(x)
∂x1D
= E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
w(x, ϕv) +
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
dx2
D
dx1
D
(1− w(x, ϕv)) +
(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
]
= E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
w(x, ϕv)−
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
(1− w(x, ϕv)) +
(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
]
∂πR(x)
∂x1R
= E
[
−∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
w(x, ϕv)−
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
dx2
R
dx1
R
(1−w(x, ϕv))−
(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
]
= E
[
−∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
w(x, ϕv) +
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
(1− w(x, ϕv))−
(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
]
The first two terms in both FOCs relate to the marginal effect of persuasion, and they enter both FOCs
in a similar way. The third term relates to priming and comparative advantage and has a different sign
for both candidates. Hence, priming creates incentives to diverge whenever E
[
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
]
6= 0,
which relates to comparative advantage. When a candidate has a comparative advantage on i, highlighting
this issue has two beneficial effects: it persuades voters and it primes an issue, in which the candidate is
13These assumption guarantee that c(xi, θi) ∈ (0, 1) and w(x, ϕv) ∈ (0, 1) for all x.
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relatively strong. The contender, who has a comparative disadvantage on i, also benefits from persuasion,
but suffers from priming the issue. This creates incentives to diverge at the margin, but also allows for
some degree of convergence. Proposition 4 formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 4 (Issue Selection and Comparative Advantage). A candidate spends more on issue i than
his opponent if and only if he has a comparative advantage on i. Both candidates spend the same on issue
i if and only if nobody has a comparative advantage on i. Formally, Sign[xiD − x
i
R] = Sign[σ
i], i = 1, 2.
The proposition highlights the possibility of perfect convergence in the absence of comparative ad-
vantages, something that can be sustained also in pure priming campaigns (see Proposition 2). More
importantly, Proposition 4 allows for imperfect convergence in interior equilibrium, where candidates
have different focus in their campaign strategies. This may help explain previous empirical findings. As
we saw earlier, a campaign that only primes or only persuades will never generate such a result. An
integrated model, however, is able to generate such a result and may thus be valuable to foster our
understanding of campaign contests.
In the setting of Example 1 this looks as follows:
Example 1 (Continued): Consider the campaign contest described in Example 1 above. In the unique
interior Nash equilibrium spending on issue 1 is
x1D =
E[ϕv]
1−4η +
2η(E[θ1v]−E[θ2v]−κ)
κ(1−4η) ,
x1R =
E[ϕv]
1−4η +
2η(E[θ2v]−E[θ1v]−κ)
κ(1−4η) ,
and spending on issue 2 follows from x2j = 1 − x
1
j , j = D,R. If E[θ
1
v ] = E[θ
2
v ], and hence if no
candidate has a comparative advantage, x1D = x
1
R, and thus candidates converge perfectly. Otherwise
Sign[xiD − x
i
R] = Sign[σ
i] with imperfect convergence/divergence. If we measure issue convergence fol-
lowing Sigelman and Buell (2004) by C ≡ 1 − 12
(
Abs[x1D − x
1
R] +Abs[x
2
D − x
2
R]
)
= 1 − Abs[x1D − x
1
R] =
1−Abs
[
4η(E[θ1v−θ2v])
κ(1−4η)
]
, the level of issue convergence decreases in Abs
[
E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
]]
.
What are the main takeaways of this section? We see that in a quite general setting it is comparative
advantage that determines whether there is convergence or divergence. In contrast to earlier papers
studying campaigning, this is the case in interior equilibrium, and hence the model is able to explain
imperfect divergence as we observe it in real campaigns.
4.2.2 Campaign Agendas
Next I turn to candidates’ “aggregate incentives” to address an issue and study which issues dominate
the campaign contest in terms of aggregate campaign spending devoted to them. In real campaigns,
voters often feel that candidates do not listen to their needs and talk about things that voters deem of
secondary importance. A recent example is the 2016 presidential campaign between Donald Trump and
Hillary Clinton. During the course of the year, the number of surveyed Americans stating that candidates
actually talked about issues they really cared about hovered between 62 and 56 percent, and just a month
11
before the election took place, in October, this number dropped to 48 percent.14 Moreover, this perception
that candidates focus on the “wrong” issues was similar for Democrats and Republicans. Another example
of candidates not focussing on voters’ priority issues can be found in the US 2008 presidential campaign.
Both John McCain and Barrack Obama spent heavily on the issue Taxes, making it the most important
issue in terms of aggregate campaign spending of this campaign.15 But Taxes was not among the five
most important issues at the time.16 Hence, it appears that campaign contests often lead candidates to
focus on issues that are not really important to voters.
Our model can help shed light on why candidates shape campaign agendas in such a way. And as
we will see in Section 5, campaign agendas matter because together with strategic issue selection they
determine which candidate tends to benefit from the campaign contest by increasing his popularity with
the voters.
Define aggregate campaign spending on issue i as Xi ≡ xiD + x
i
R. To understand what determines
campaign agendas we take another look at the first order conditions. From there it follows that in any
interior equilibrium the following must hold:
E
[(
∂c(xi,θiv)
∂x1
D
− ∂c(x
i,θiv)
∂x1
R
)
w(x, ϕv)
]
= E
[(
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
− ∂c(x
2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
)
(1− w(x, ϕv))
]
.
This is independent of priming and comparative advantages and hence, loosely speaking, in an interior
equilibrium aggregate incentives to address an issue are mostly driven by candidates’ desire to persuade.
How strong persuasion incentives are depends on an issue’s importance and potentially on θiv(1− θ
i
v) (see
Assumption 3). Thus, ceteris paribus, an issue should receive a greater share of total campaign spending
when its relative importance increases, when voters’ assessment of candidates’ competence on the issue
becomes more similar (θi(1− θi) increases), or when voters’ assessment of candidates’ competence on the
other issue becomes less similar (θj(1− θj) decreases).
Proposition 5. Candidates may campaign hardest on the least important issue. In particular, if voters
have strong convictions on an important issues and are undecided on an unimportant issue, the latter may
dominate the campaign in terms of aggregate spending.
As the proposition only states a possibility result, I prove it below by providing two examples where
it holds. The proposition provides a rationale for inverse campaign agendas, i.e., for candidates directing
their resources to the issues that voters do not consider very important. Incentives to persuade are
important determinants for aggregate incentives to campaign on an issue. If voters are easily swayed on
an issue, both candidates may have strong incentives to campaign on it, even if there are other and more
important issues. Of course, this may lead candidates to campaign on the most important issues with
the greatest intensity, but as Proposition 5 shows, also less intuitive equilibria with inverse agendas are
possible:
14For sources of this data, see https://news.gallup.com/poll/196607/sharp-drop-views-candidates-talk-key-issues.
aspx?g_source=POLITICS&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles (last retrieved: June 5, 2019).
15See for example https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/president/advertising/advertisers/8-john-mccain.
html.
16For sources of this data, see https://news.gallup.com/poll/108331/obama-has-edge-key-election-issues.aspx
(last retrieved: June 5, 2019).
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Example 2: Consider the campaign contest defined in Example 1, but let E[θ1v ] = E[θ
2
v ] and
c(xi, θiv) = max
{
min
{
θi + κi
(
(xiD −
1
2
(xiD)
2)− (xiR −
1
2
(xiR)
2)
)
, 1
}
, 0
}
for some κi > 0. Moreover, let θ
i
+ κ
i
2 < 1 and θ
i − κ
i
2 > 0. Then the campaign contest has a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover,
Sign[X1 −X2] = Sign
[
E[ϕv ]−
κ2
κ1 + κ2
]
= Sign
[
E[ϕv ]−
1
1 + ν
]
,
where ν ≡ κ
1
κ2
. Figure 1 shows how ν and E[ϕv ] influence aggregate spending on the issues.
Example 2 showed how an issue’s importance and the issue specific marginal effectiveness of persuasion
together shape aggregate incentives to address an issue. The differences in marginal effectiveness were
thereby assumed and it is not clear how they relate to the conditions candidates face during a campaign
contest. By Assumption 4 the marginal effectiveness of persuasion depends on the distribution of θiv. The
next example, in which I study a specific but quite popular version of c(xi, θiv), a generalized Tullock
contest, shows how this affects campaign agendas:
Example 3: Consider a campaign contest where
c(xi, θiv) =
θivf(x
i
D)
θivf(x
i
D) + (1− θ
i
v)f(x
i
R)
,
where f(x) is a concave and increasing function with f(0) > 0 and f ′(0) =∞. Moreover, let C1(θ1v) be a
mean-preserving spread of C2(θ2v), implying E[θ
1
v ] = E[θ
2
v ] and thus that no candidate has a comparative
advantage, and E[(θ1v)
2] > E[(θ2v)
2]. Everything else is like in Example 1. Then there exists η¯ > 0 such
that for all η ∈ [0, η¯] the campaign contest has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and that
Sign[X1 −X2] = Sign
[
E[ϕv ]−
ρ2
ρ1 + ρ2
]
= Sign
[
E[ϕv ]−
1
1 + ν
]
,
where ρi ≡ E[θiv(1 − θ
i
v)] and ν ≡ ρ
1/ρ2. Therefore, candidates campaign more intensely on issue 2
unless issue 1 is significantly more important. Figure 1 again shows how ν and E[ϕv ] influence aggregate
spending on the issues.
The example shows that more divisive issues tend to receive less attention, and the intuition is clear:
ceteris paribus, as an issue becomes more divisive, voters have stronger opinions and are harder to per-
suade. Hence, it becomes less attractive to campaign on the issue.
Note that if both candidates campaign hardest on the same issue, a candidate may campaign with
the greatest intensity on his weakest issue, the issue of the comparative disadvantage. The reason for
this is, as before, that when an issue is important, persuasion is also important, and so independent of
comparative advantages it may be worthwhile to campaign intensely on an important issue:
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Figure 1: aggregate campaign agendas as a function of ν and E[ϕv].
Example 1 (Continued): D spends more on issue 2 than on issue 1 if
E[ϕv ] <
1
2
−
2η
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
κ
.
For example, if η = 110 , κ =
1
4 , E[θ
1
v ] =
55
100 , E[θ
2
v ] =
45
100 , and E[ϕv ] =
2
5 , then x
1
D =
7
15 <
8
15 = x
2
D, and
hence D spends most of his budget on his weakest issue.
5 Implications: Candidate Selection and Nomination
So far the focus was on understanding candidate behavior in campaign contests, but not on the conse-
quences campaign contests have for political outcomes. In this section I will shift focus on the implications
of campaign contests.
5.1 Candidate Selection
An important question is how campaign contests influence candidates’ equilibrium vote shares. Bartels
(1992) hypothesizes that campaign contests are likely to have no consequences at all, and he provides the
following intuition:
“In a world where most campaigners make reasonably effective use of reasonably similar re-
sources and technologies most of the time, much of their effort will necessarily be without
visible impact, simply because every campaigner’s efforts are balanced against more or less
equally effective efforts to produce the opposite effect.”
(Bartels, 1992, p. 267)
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In fact, many studies have derived this result formally, see for example Proposition 2 in Meirowitz (2008),
Proposition 2 in Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013), or Propositions 1 and 2 in Denter and Sisak (2015). In
the next Proposition I challenge this finding and show that campaign contests tend to structurally benefit
one of the candidates:
Proposition 6. In a neighborhood of η = 0, in any interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium Candidate D
benefits during the campaign if
Ψ ≡ (E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ])(X
1 −X2) > 0,
Candidate R benefits if Ψ < 0, and no candidate benefits when Ψ = 0.
Absent comparative advantages, no candidate benefits and the campaign contests remains neutral.
This result makes intuitive sense, because in this case perceived competence does not change and since
it is equal in both issues, shifting issue weights has no consequence for candidate selection. Similarly,
if X1 = X2, relative issue importance does not change, and hence changes in issue specific candidate
evaluation balance each other out. However, when candidates have comparative advantages agenda setting
starts to become important. Having a comparative advantage on an issue means one further improves
one’s standing with the voters on that issue, but loses on the other issue. Whether or not this is beneficial
depends on whether or not the issue of the comparative advantage becomes more important during the
campaign contest or not. This way, the intuitions derived in Sections 4.2.1 for relative issue emphasis and
4.2.2 for campaign agendas together determine which candidate can use the campaign contest to the own
advantage.
Proposition 6 shows who benefits from the campaign contest, but the formal analysis focussed on the
case when η ≈ 0. A relevant question is now whether the result stated in the proposition is robust. The
following example shows that the underlying intuition is valid more generally, that is when η is strictly
positive:
Example 1 (Continued): In an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium Candidate D benefits during the
campaign if
Ψ ≡ (E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ])(X
1 −X2) > 0,
Candidate R benefits if Ψ < 0, and no candidate benefits when Ψ = 0.
At this moment it is useful to relate the implications of a campaign with both priming and persuasion
to a campaign where one of the two effects is absent. Propositions 1 and 2 characterize equilibrium in these
cases. A campaign that does not prime leads to perfect convergence and this implies that no candidate
benefits from the campaign contest, as issues’ weights remain unchanged and relative competence remains
unchanged as an equilibrium outcome. A campaign that does not persuade but primes leads to perfect
divergence, and again no candidate benefits from the campaign contest, as relative competence remains
constant and issues’ relative weights remain constant as well. The analysis in this section reveals that the
campaign contest affects winning probabilities only if both effects play a role at the same time. Hence,
the integrated model is necessary not only to derive the results on imperfect convergence, but also to
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Figure 2: A campaign with η = 1
10
, κ = 1
2
, and E[θ2v] =
45
100
. To the right of the solid line D’s equilibrium vote
share πEQD is greater than 50 percent. To the right of the dashed line D’s initial vote share π
0
D is greater than 50
percent. In the upper, blue-shaded area below the solid and above the dashed line D loses the majority during
the campaign contest, while in the lower, brown shaded area below the dashed and above the solid line D gains a
majority.
understand the implications of campaign contests for candidate selection on Election Day.
5.2 Candidate Nomination
Understanding how campaign contests influence candidate selection on Election Day of course has impor-
tant consequences for optimal candidate nomination. Assuming office motivation, the right candidate is
the one that maximizes the chances of getting elected or the one maximizing the expected vote share of
the party. The important question is, therefore, which candidate from a given candidate pool achieves
this goal. Our above analysis reveals that the a priori popularity of a candidate is no sufficient reason
to choose a candidate. Rather, the potential to develop in the campaign contest needs to be taken into
account to make a good judgement. If this potential, captured by Ψ, is sufficiently large, an a priori less
popular contender may in fact be the expected winner of an election. We show this by way of an example:
Example 1 (Continued): Assume E[θ1v ] > E[θ
2
v ], E[ϕv ] >
1
2 , and u
0 < 12 , i.e., that D is the less popular
candidate at the campaign outset. Candidate D is able to turn this initial disadvantage into an advantage
during the campaign contest if
η >
1
2 − E
[
θ1vϕv + θ
2
v(1− ϕv)
]
2(1 − E [θ1v + θ
2
v ]
.
The example shows that indeed the a priori weaker candidate might have better chances to win the
election than his seemingly stronger contender. This leads us back to the question posed in the first
paragraph of the introduction: is it possible that a candidate who initially trails his contender by 5
16
percentage points is the actually stronger candidate? Consider Example 1 and let ω1 = 14 , ω
2 = 59100 ,
ϕ = 13 , η =
85
1000 , and κ =
1
2 . Then the campaign contest has a unique interior pure strategy equilibrium
and D’s vote share increases from θ1ϕ + θ2(1 − ϕ) = 0.475 before the campaign contest to 0.505 after.
Hence, D turns a deficit of 5 percentage points into a victory.17 Figure 2 shows combinations of parameter
values for which the identity of the stronger candidate changes endogenously during the campaign contest
of Example 1. Hence, selecting candidates based on poll results may be misguided.18
While it is tempting to use polling figures to judge a candidate’s chances to succeed in an election,
the model suggests that a comparison of before-nomination poll results may be a bad guide for candidate
selection. Initial popularity does not say anything about a candidate’s potential to develop during the
campaign contest. This potential is captured by Ψ. Of course, all else equal, greater popularity is a good
thing, but typically candidates are not identical and thus a candidates’ potential to develop during the
contest should be taken into account as well. A candidate’s identity influences the campaign contest and
therefore also equilibrium campaigning. Candidates’ comparative advantages matter for their potential
to develop during the campaign contest. Therefore, the currently more popular candidate could well be
a bad choice as a running candidate, if the goal is to maximize electoral prospects.
A candidate may not only stand for issue specific qualities, but may just by her or his presence in
the campaign contest prime some issues; that is, a candidate’s identity may influence the distribution of
ϕiv . For example, because of the Benghazi affairs, Hillary Clinton being the candidate for presidential
office ‘primed’ issues like Trustworthiness and Leadership, which turned out to be major obstacles in her
campaign.19 With Bernie Sanders as the running candidate, these issues might have been less important
17Prato and Wolton (2018) also show that under certain conditions the ex-ante less popular candidate might structurally
benefit during a campaign contest. In their paper, which only has one policy dimension, this is the case if the race is
imbalanced due to partisan preferences. In the current paper I uncover a new channel for such the a priori less popular
candidate to benefit from the campaign contest. Moreover, in Prato and Wolton (2018) the a priori less popular candidate
remains less popular, even though the gap may become smaller. To the contrary, the current model shows that in some
campaigns the a priori less popular candidate can be actually the stronger candidate.
18 Of course, the quality of a candidate is often judged based on poll results. For example, the Democratic Party in the US
was faced with a similar question in 2016. Donald Trump was already selected as the candidate of the Republican Party, but
both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders were still in the race of the Democratic Party. In the end, Hillary Clinton won the
nomination, but she lost the election on November 8, 2016. After this defeat, many have questioned that she was the optimal
candidate to challenge Donald Trump, and that Bernie Sanders would have been a better choice. For example, USA Today
cast doubt on the optimality of her nomination, citing polls that saw Bernie Sanders relatively stronger vis-a´-vis Donald
Trump: “The RealClearPolitics average from May 6-June 5 had Sanders at 49.7% to Trump’s 39.3%, a 10.4-point cushion.
In that same time frame, Trump was polling close to Clinton and was even ahead in multiple polls.” (source: https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/11/09/bernie-sanders-donald-trump/93530352/ (last retrieved:
June 6, 2019)). Similarly, early in 2017 Angela Merkel, the then sitting chancellor of Germany, announced to run again as
her party’s (CDU) candidate in the general election in Germany. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the CDU’s
main contender, had not yet decided on a candidate, but soon after Angela Merkel’s decision selected Martin Schulz, the pres-
ident of the European Parliament at the time, over the then acting Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy and vice
chancellor of Germany, Sigmar Gabriel. The justification for this, it seems, was that according to public opinion polls Schulz
had better chances to beat Merkel in an election. For example, Reuters wrote the following: “Opinion polls suggest Schulz,
61, has a better chance than Gabriel – though still very small – of unseating the conservative Merkel, who has led Germany
since 2005 and is Europe’s most powerful leader.” (source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-spd/
german-spd-chief-gabriel-makes-way-for-schulz-to-run-against-merkel-idUSKBN15824X (last retrieved: June 6,
2019)).
19For example, Forbes reported the following: “Days after the massacre, Clinton told a father, mother, sister and uncle
before the flag-draped coffins of the four victims that an errant video maker caused their loved-ones’ deaths and that she
would make sure that he was brought to justice. The tearful relatives related to the press Clinton’s words almost immediately
and expressed their outrage that she would lie to them on such an occasion.” Source: https: // www. forbes. com/ sites/
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and others would have been considered more important instead. Of course, this form of issue priming
is another important determinant for optimal candidate nomination. In particular, optimal nomination
should be such that the selected candidate primes the own strength rather then the own weakness.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a model of campaign contests, in which candidates compete for electoral
success by spending time or money on different policy issues. The novelty is that I allow for simultaneous
issue priming and persuasion. This allows me to develop a whole new set of testable predictions about
candidate behavior, which have important consequences for candidate selection on Election Day and
optimal candidate nomination.
The main results are the following: While persuasion aligns candidates’ incentives in the campaign to
campaign on a certain issue, priming drives a wedge between them. I develop a notion of comparative
advantage that determines the size of this wedge and determines whether or not candidates campaign
with similar intensities on an issue or not. Generally, a candidate who enjoys a comparative advantage
on an issue addresses this issue with greater intensity than his competitor. I show that this relative
issue emphasis together with the aggregate emphasis issues receive determines which candidate cna use
the campaign to the own advantage. In particular, having comparative advantage on an issue on which
candidates campaign with great intensity is beneficial and allows a candidate to increase his electoral
support during the campaign contest. This may even go so far that an a priori less popular candidate
might actually be stronger than his contender, once equilibrium campaigning is taken into account. This
has important implication for optimal candidate nomination, as a candidate’s potential to develop and
thrive during the campaign contest matters.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Candidates’ strategy spaces are convex and compact, as x1j ∈ [0, B]. Also note that individual payoff
functions are continuous in all variables by Assumptions 1 and 2. To ensure existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, it hence suffices to show that payoff functions are strictly quasi-concave in x1j , because
this allows us to apply standard results (see for example Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
When η = 0, the first derivative of j’s payoff function is
∂πD(x)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
= E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
ϕv +
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
dx2D
dx1
D
(1− ϕv)
]
= E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
ϕv −
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
(1− ϕv)
]
∂πR(x)
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
η=0
= E
[
−∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
ϕv −
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
dx2
R
dx1
R
(1− ϕv)
]
= E
[
−∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
ϕv +
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
(1− ϕv)
]
paulroderickgregory/ 2016/ 06/ 29/ how-benghazi-can-still-hurt-hillary-clinton/ # 66d8c5a1599c .
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and
∂2πD(x)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣
η=0
= E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
ϕv −
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
D
)2
dx2D
dx1
D
(1− ϕv)
]
= E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
ϕv +
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
D
)2
(1− ϕv)
]
< 0,
∂2πR(x)
∂(x1
R
)2
∣∣∣
η=0
= E
[
−∂
2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
R
)2
ϕv +
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
R
)2
dx2
R
dx1
R
(1− ϕv)
]
= E
[
−∂
2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
R
)2
ϕv −
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
R
)2
(1− ϕv)
]
< 0,
implying individual payoffs are strictly concave and thus also quasi-concave. Hence, equilibrium exists.
Next turn to the second part of the proposition. The following lemma is very useful:
Lemma 1.
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= −
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=
∂c(xi, 1− θiv)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= −
∂c(xi, 1− θiv)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
Proof. By Assumption 2, c(x, x, θiv) = θ
i
v. Thus,
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, θ
i
v)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
+
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, θ
i
v)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= 0⇔
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, θ
i
v)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= −
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, θ
i
v)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
and of course as well
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, 1− θ
i
v)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= −
∂c(xiD, x
i
R, 1− θ
i
v)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
.
Moreover, also by Assumption 2, c(x, y, θiv) = 1− c(y, x, 1 − θ
i
v) and thus
∂c(x,y,θiv)
∂x
= −∂c(y,x,1−θ
i
v)
∂x
and of
course as well
∂c(x, y, θiv)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=y
= −
∂c(y, x, 1 − θiv)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=y
.
Therefore,
−
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= −
∂c(xi, 1− θiv)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=
∂c(xi, 1− θiv)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
,
which proves the lemma.
When candidates choose identical spending profiles, they have the same marginal utility of campaign-
ing on the different issues. An implication is that if the current spending profile is either (x1D, x
1
R) = (0, 0)
or (x1D, x
1
R) = (B,B), if D has no incentive to deviate neither has R and vice versa.
To proceed we need one more lemma:
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Lemma 2. If c(xi, θiv) ∈ (0, 1),
−
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR


>
=
<

 1 if xiD − xiR


<
=
>

 0.
Proof. First note that by Lemma 1
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
+
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= 0⇔ ρi(xi, θiv) ≡ −
∂c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
∂c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
= 1.
Now take the derivative of ρi(xi, θiv) with respect to x
i
D:
∂ρi(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
= −
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
−
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR∂x
i
D(
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
)2 .
This is negative if and only if
−
(
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
−
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR∂x
i
D
)
< 0
⇔
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
−
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR∂x
i
D
> 0
⇔
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
>
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR∂x
i
D
⇔
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
>
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR∂x
i
D
This is the case by Assumption 4 and hence ρi(xi, θiv) is monotone decreasing in x
i
D. In a similar way we
can prove that ρi(xi, θiv) monotonically increases in x
i
R. Thus,
ρi(xi, θiv)


>
=
<

 1 if xiD − xiR


<
=
>

 0,
which proves the lemma.
Note that the lemma implies that when xiD > x
i
R,
∂c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
< ∂c(x
i,θiv)
∂xi
R
and vice versa:
Corollary 1.
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD
+
∂c(xi, θiv)
∂xiR


>
=
<

 0 if xiD − xiR


<
=
>

 0.
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The marginal product of persuasion of Candidate D relative to Candidate R depends on who spends
more on the issue so far, independent of θiv. Hence, an equilibrium in which only one candidate campaigns
on issue i and the other chooses zero effort cannot exist. When equilibrium is not interior, both candidates
choose the same level of effort on issue 1 and hence converge completely.
Next consider the first order conditions. In an interior equilibrium, both FOCs need to hold simulta-
neously. Thus,
E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
ϕv −
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
(1− ϕv)
]
= 0 = E
[
−∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
ϕv +
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
(1− ϕv)
]
⇔ E
[(
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
+ ∂c(x
1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
)
ϕv
]
= E
[(
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
+ ∂c(x
2,θ2v)
∂x2
R
)
(1− ϕv)
] (A.1)
By Lemma 1, (A.1) holds if x1D = x
1
R, as both the LHS and RHS are zero. Now assume x
1
D 6= x
1
R, for
example x1D > x
1
R. Then the LHS of (A.1) is negative, while the RHS is positive, because x
1
D > x
1
R ⇔
x2D < x
2
R. Hence, this cannot be the case in interior equilibrium. Similarly, x
1
D < x
1
R is not possible
either. Hence, in any interior equilibrium, both candidates campaign with identical intensity on all issues,
xiD = x
i
R for i = 1, 2, and thus they converge completely.
To prove uniqueness, evaluate the first order condition given x1D = x
1
R = x
1 and reorganize:
E


∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
x1j=x
1
∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
x1j=x
1

 = E
[
1− ϕv
ϕv
]
.
If we can show that this is monotone in x1 equilibrium must be unique. Taking the derivative with respect
to x1 yields
E


∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1

 ∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1
+
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1

+ ∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1

 ∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1
+
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1



 ∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
x1
j
=x1


2


, (A.2)
where we already used that dx2j/dx
1
j = −1. If this is strictly positive or strictly negative equilibrium is
unique. To determine the sign of this we need a last lemma:
Lemma 3.
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂xiD∂x
i
R
∣∣∣∣
x1j=x
1
= −
1
2

 ∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiD)
2
∣∣∣∣
x1j=x
1
+
∂2c(xi, θiv)
∂(xiR)
2
∣∣∣∣
x1j=x
1

 .
Proof. We know from Lemma 1 that ∂c(x
i,θiv)
∂xi
D
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
+ ∂c(x
i,θiv)
∂xi
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
= 0. Totally differentiating
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with respect to xi yields
∂2c(xi,θiv)
∂(xi
D
)2
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
+ ∂
2c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∂xi
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
+ ∂
2c(xi,θiv)
∂(xi
R
)2
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
+ ∂
2c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∂xi
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
= 0
⇔ ∂
2c(xi,θiv)
∂xi
D
∂xi
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
= −12
(
∂2c(xi,θiv)
∂(xi
D
)2
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
+ ∂
2c(xi,θiv)
∂(xi
R
)2
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi
)
,
which is the condition stated in the lemma.
Using the lemma condition (A.2) simplifies to
E


∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi

 ∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi
−
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x1
R
)2
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi

+ ∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi

 ∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi
−
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
R
)2
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi


2

 ∂c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣∣
xi
j
=xi


2


< 0.
In a similar fashion we can establish the result using the first order condition of candidate R. Thus,
equilibrium is unique, which proves the proposition. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If campaigning only primes issues, the first derivative of j’s payoff function is
∂πD(x)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
c(xi,θiv)=θ
i
v∀i,v
= E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
+ ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
D
dx2
D
dx1
D
)]
= E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
D
)]
= E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
)]
E
[(
∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
D
)]
∂πR(x)
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
c(xi,θiv)=θ
i
v∀i,v
= −E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
+ ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
dx2R
dx1
R
)]
= −E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
)]
= −E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
)]
E
[(
∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
)]
Note that Sign
[
E
[(
θ1v − θ
2
v
)]]
= Sign[σ1], as
Sign
[
σ1
]
= Sign
[
E[θ1v ]−
1
2
(
θ1v + θ
2
v
)]
= Sign
[
E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
]]
.
Therefore, if σ1 = σ2 = 0, any combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium, as campaigning has no
effect whatsoever. Otherwise, i.e., when σ1 > 0 and σ2 < 0, D spends all of his budget on issue 1 and R
spends all of his budget on issue 2, because E
[(
∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
)]
> 0, and the opposite is true when
σ1 < 0 and σ2 > 0. In other words, candidates never campaign on the same issue and thus they diverge
completely. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
When η is small the proof follows by a continuity argument from the proof of Proposition 1 and implies
also uniqueness. However, for larger η it is not clear that utilities are quasi-concave. Baye et al. (1993)
provide sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when payoffs may fail to
be quasi-concave. In particular, (i) strategy spaces eed to be convex and compact and the aggregator
function Uagg(x) ≡ uD(x) + uR(x) needs to be (ii) diagonally transfer continuous and (iii) diagonally
transfer quasi-concave. (i) clearly holds by assumption. (ii) follows from Proposition 2 of Baye et al.
(1993), as both uD and uR are continuous, which is a weaker condition than diagonal transfer continuity.
Finally, Uagg is constant (= 1) and thus quasi-concave, which by Proposition 1 of Baye et al. (1993) is
sufficient for diagonal transfer quasi-concavity. Thus, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Moreover,
a corner equilibrium cannot exists as the marginal product of xij would be either plus (x
i
j = 0) or minus
infinity (xij = B). Consequently, each payoff function has an interior maximum and at this maximum
the payoff functions must be concave. Hence, Nash equilibria are determined by the respective first-order
conditions.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The candidates’ respective objective is to maximize
πD(x) = E
[
c(x1, θ1v)w(x, ϕv) + c(x
2, θ2v) (1− w(x, ϕv))
]
s.t. x1D + x
2
D = B
πR(x) = E
[(
1− c(x1, θ1v)
)
w(x, ϕv) +
(
1− c(x2, θ2v)
)
(1− w(x, ϕv))
]
s.t. x1R + x
2
R = B
(A.3)
If an interior equilibrium exists, it is determined by the system of first order conditions, which are
∂πD(x)
∂x1D
= E
[
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1D
w(x, ϕ1v) +
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2D
dx2D
dx1
D
(
1− w(x, ϕ1v)
)]
+ E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
+ ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
D
dx2D
dx1
D
)]
= E
[
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1D
w(x, ϕ1v)−
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2D
(
1−w(x, ϕ1v)
)]
+ E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
D
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
D
)]
∂πR(x)
∂x1R
= E
[
−
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1R
w(x, ϕ1v)−
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2R
dx2
R
dx1
R
(
1−w(x, ϕ1v)
)]
− E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
+ ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
dx2
R
dx1
R
)]
= E
[
−
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1R
w(x, ϕ1v) +
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2R
(
1− w(x, ϕ1v)
)]
− E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
R
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
R
)]
(A.4)
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Note that ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂xi
R
= ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂xi
D
= ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂xi
. In any interior equilibrium it needs to hold that:
E
[(
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1D
+
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1R
)
w(x, ϕ1v)−
(
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2D
+
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2R
)(
1− w(x, ϕ1v)
)]
= −2E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
) (∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
)]
= −2E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
)]
E
[(
∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
)]
Note that when x1D > x
1
R we also have x
2
D < x
2
R. By Corollary 1 this means that
Sign
[
E
[(
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1D
+
∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1R
)
w(x, ϕ1v)−
(
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2D
+
∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2R
)(
1− w(x, ϕ1v)
)]]
= −Sign[x1D − x
1
R].
Consequently, in any interior equilibrium
−Sign[x1D − x
1
R] = Sign
[
−2E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
)]
E
[(
∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x1
− ∂w(x,ϕv)
∂x2
)]]
⇔ Sign[x1D − x
1
R] = Sign
[
E
[(
c(x1, θ1v)− c(x
2, θ2v)
)]]
.
To see that this also implies that Sign[x1D − x
1
R] = Sign
[
E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
]]
, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.
Sign
[
∂x1D
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=0
−
∂x1R
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=0
]
= Sign
[
E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
]]
.
Proof. To derive comparative statics of spending with respect to η we totally differentiate the system of
first-order conditions and evaluate the result at η = 0. Totally differentiating the FOCs and evaluating
the result at η = 0 yields
∂2πD(x)
∂(x1
D
)2
∣∣∣
η=0
= E [ϕv]E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
]
+ (1− E [ϕv])E
[
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x1
D
)2
]
∂2πD(x)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
η=0
= E [ϕv]E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
]
+ (1− E [ϕv])E
[
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
]
∂2πD(x)
∂x1
D
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
= −2(g(X1)− g(X2))E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
]
−E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
] (
g′(X1) + g′(X2)
)
∂2πR(x)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
η=0
= −E [ϕv ]E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
]
− (1− E [ϕv ])E
[
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
]
∂2πR(x)
∂(x1
R
)2
∣∣∣
η=0
= −E [ϕv ]E
[
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
R
)2
]
− (1− E [ϕv ])E
[
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x1
R
)2
]
∂2πR(x)
∂x1
R
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
= 2(g(X1)− g(X2))E
[
∂c(x1,θ1v)
∂x1
R
]
+ E
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
] (
g′(X1) + g′(X2)
)
Define
M =

 ∂2πD∂(x1D)2 ∂2πD∂x1D∂x1R
∂2πR
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
∂2πR
∂(x1
R
)2

 , MD =

 − ∂2πD∂x1D∂η ∂2πD∂x1D∂x1R
− ∂
2πR
∂x1
R
∂η
∂2πR
∂(x1
R
)2

 , and MR =

 ∂2πD∂(x1D)2 − ∂2πD∂x1D∂η
∂2πR
∂x1
D
∂x1
R
− ∂
2πR
∂x1
R
∂η

 .
Equilibrium comparative statics are
∂x1
D
(η)
∂η
= |MD||M | and
∂x1
R
(η)
∂η
= |MR||M | . Using Lemmas 1 and 3 together
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with η = 0 and xiR = x
i
D yields
∂x1D
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=0
−
∂x1R
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=0
=
4E[θ1v − θ
2
v]
(
g′(X1) + g′(X2)
)
E
[
ϕv
(
∂2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
R
)2
− ∂
2c(x1,θ1v)
∂(x1
D
)2
)
+ (1− ϕv)
(
∂2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
R
)2
− ∂
2c(x2,θ2v)
∂(x2
D
)2
)]
As the sign of the denominator is clearly positive, the sign of the whole expression depends on the sign
of the numerator, and hence on E[θ1v − θ
2
v ].
Hence, when η small but positive, the candidate with the a priori comparative advantage spends more
on an issue. Say D has comparative advantage on 1. Could R spend more on this issue when η increases
further? Note that spending is a continuous function of all parameters. For R to spend more on 1,
continuity implies that first there must be η such that both spend the same. But that is not possible,
as when both spend the same comparative advantage remains unchanged, and thus D needs to spend
more on it. Moreover, could it be true that one candidate spends more than another on an issue absent
comparative advantages? The answer is no again. To see this note that if E[θ1v ] = E[θ
2
v ]+ ǫ for any ǫ > 0,
x1D > x
1
R. Moreover, for any ǫ < 0, x
1
D < x
1
R. By continuity (along this sequence of equilibria), when
ǫ = 0, x1D = x
1
R. This implies that Sign
[
x1D − x
1
R
]
= Sign
[
θ1v − θ
2
v
]
is generally true. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the proposition, I study equilibrium when η = 0 and then totally differentiate the system of
FOCs at the symmetric equilibrium:
E

 ∂c(x1, θ1v)
∂x1j
∣∣∣∣∣
x1
D
=x1
R
=x1

 = E[1− ϕv]
E[ϕv ]
E

 ∂c(x2, θ2v)
∂x2j
∣∣∣∣∣
x2
D
=x2
R
=B−x1

 . (A.5)
This is the FOC for both candidates at the symmetric equilibrium.
The vote share of D as a function of η is
Υ(η) = E
[
c(x1(η), θ1v)
(
ϕv + η
(
g(x1D(η) + x
1
R(η))− g(2B − x
1
D(η) − x
1
R(η))
))
+ c(x2(η), θ2v)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
g(xD(η)
1 + x1R(η)) − g(2B − x
1
D(η)− x
1
R(η))
)))]
Note that Υ(0) = E[θ1vϕv + θ
2
v(1 − ϕv)]. When η now increases, the vote shares changes in the following
way:
Υ′(η)|η=0∧x1
D
=x1
R
=x1 = E[ϕv ]
(
∂x1
D
(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
+
∂x1
R
(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
η=0
)
− (1− E[ϕv ])
(
∂x1D(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
η=0
+
∂x1R(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x2
R
∣∣∣
η=0
)
+
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
(g(X1)− g(X2))
It follows from Lemma 1 that ∂c(x
1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
= ∂c(x
1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
η=0
and ∂c(x
2(η),θ2v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
η=0
= ∂c(x
2(η),θ2v)
∂x2
R
∣∣∣
η=0
.
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Thus,
Υ′(η)|η=0∧x1
D
=x1
R
=x1 = E[ϕv ]
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
(
∂x1D(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
+
∂x1R(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
)
− (1 −E[ϕv ])
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
η=0
(
∂x1D(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
+
∂x1R(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
)
+
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
(g(X1)− g(X2))
=
(
E[ϕv ]
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
− (1−E[ϕv ])
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
η=0
)(
∂x1
D
(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
+
∂x1
R
(η)
∂η
∣∣∣
η=0
)
+
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
(g(X1)− g(X2))
Finally, using (A.5) it becomes apparent that
(
E[ϕv ]E
[
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
η=0
]
− (1− E[ϕv ])E
[
∂c(x1(η),θ1v)
∂x2
D
∣∣∣
η=0
])
=
0, and hence the condition boils down to
Υ′(η)
∣∣
η=0∧x1
D
=x1
R
=x1
=
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
(g(X1)− g(X2)).
When Υ′(0) > 0, for sufficiently small but positive η, D benefits from the campaign contest, while R can
use the contest to his advantage if Υ′(0) < 0. If Υ′(0) = 0 the candidates’ vote shares remain constant.
As g′(x) > 0, Sign[g(X1)−g(X2)] = Sign[X1−X2], and thus I can rephrase the condition for D to benefit
as
Ψ =
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
(X1 −X2) > 0.
This proves the proposition. 
B The Examples
B.1 Example 1:
Given the assumptions, c(xi, θiv) ∈ (0, 1) and w(x, ϕv) ∈ (0, 1) for all [x
1
D, x
1
R] ∈ [0, B]
2. The FOCs are
∂πD
∂x1D
= 2η(E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]− κ+ 2κ · x
1
D) + κ(E[ϕv ]− x
1
D) = 0,
∂πR
∂x1R
= 2η(E[θ2v ]− E[θ
1
v ]− κ+ 2κ · x
1
R) + κ(E[ϕv ]− x
1
R) = 0,
while the SOCs are
∂2πj
∂(x1j )
2
= κ(4η − 1) < 0⇔ η <
1
4
.
The SOCs hold whenever η < 14 , which is the case by assumption, as ϕ+ 2η < 1 and ϕ− 2η > 0. Hence,
the candidates’ decision problems are concave and strategy spaces are compact and convex, implying that
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Moreover, the FOCs are linear and independent of the other
candidate’s effort choice. Thus, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and if κ sufficiently
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large this equilibrium must be interior. In this case we find
x1D =
E[ϕv ]
1− 4η
+
2η
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]− κ
)
κ(1− 4η)
=
E[ϕv ]
1− 4η
+
2η
(
E[θ1v ]− E[θ
2
v ]
)
κ(1 − 4η)
−
2η
1− 4η
,
x1R =
E[ϕv ]
1− 4η
+
2η
(
E[θ2v ]− E[θ
1
v ]− κ
)
κ(1− 4η)
=
E[ϕv ]
1− 4η
+
2η
(
E[θ2v ]− E[θ
1
v ]
)
κ(1 − 4η)
−
2η
1− 4η
.
(B.1)
This implies
X1 =
2(E[ϕv ]− 2η)
1− 4η
and X2 =
2 ((1− E[ϕv ])− 2η)
1− 4η
.
Given (B.1), equilibrium vote shares are
SD =
E
[
θ1vϕv + θ
2
v(1− ϕv)
]
− 2η
(
E[θ1v + θ
2
v ]
)
1− 4η
,
SR = 1− SD.
(B.2)
Note that when η = 0 the vote shares remain unchanged, as
SD|η=0 = S
0
D = E
[
θ1vϕv + θ
2
v(1− ϕv)
]
.
Given the above, candidate D benefits during the campaign contest if and only if
SD > S
0
D ⇔
S0
D
−2η(E[θ1v+θ2v])
1−4η > S
0
D
⇔ E[θ2v ](
1
2 − E[ϕv ]) > E[θ
1
v ](
1
2 − E[ϕv ])
⇔ E[θ1v ](E[ϕv ]−
1
2) > E[θ
2
v ](E[ϕv ]−
1
2).
If E[ϕv ] >
1
2 , this is the case when E[θ
1
v ] > E[θ
2
v ], otherwise if E[θ
1
v ] < E[θ
2
v ]. Thus, the candidate having
the comparative advantage in the more important issue benefits during the campaign contest.
If S0D <
1
2 , Candidate D is a priori weaker than Candidate R. If SD >
1
2 , Candidate D is a posteriori
stronger than Candidate R. If both are true at the same time, D is able to turn an initial disadvantage
into an advantage. Simple manipulations show that SD >
1
2 ⇔ S
0
D >
1
2 + 2η
(
E[θ1v + θ
2
v ]− 1
)
. Note that
when E[ϕv ] >
1
2 , S
0
D <
1
2 implies that E[θ
1
v + θ
2
v ] < 1. Thus, we can further reformulate to get
η >
1
2 − S
0
D
2(1− E [θ1v + θ
2
v]
=
1
2 − E
[
θ1vϕv + θ
2
v(1− ϕv)
]
2(1− E [θ1v + θ
2
v]
,
which is the condition from the example. 
B.2 Example 2:
Given the assumptions, c(xi, θiv) ∈ (0, 1) and w(x, ϕv) ∈ (0, 1) for all [x
1
D, x
1
R] ∈ [0, B]
2. A proof analogous
to the one in Example 1 establishes existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Take the derivatives of candidates’ payoff functions with respect to their respective effort in issue 1:
∂πD
∂x1D
= κ1E[ϕv ] + ηκ
2
(
3x1D
2
+ 2x1D(x
1
R − 1)− x
1
R
2
)
− κ1x1DE[ϕv ] + κ
2x1D(E[ϕv ]− 1)
+ ηκ1
(
−2x1Dx
1
R − 3(x
1
D − 2)x
1
D + x
1
R
2
− 2
)
= 0,
∂πR
∂x1R
= κ1E[ϕv ] + ηκ
1((x1D − 3x
1
R)(x
1
D + x
1
R) + 6x
1
R − 2)− κ
1E[ϕv ]x
1
R + κ
2x1R(E[ϕv ]− 1)
− ηκ2((x1D − 3x
1
R)(x
1
D + x
1
R) + 2x
1
R) = 0,
This system of equations has no simple solution, but I can use the fact that
∂πD
∂x1D
+
∂πR
∂x1R
= 0 in any
interior equilibrium. Letting X1 ≡ x1D + x
1
R,
∂πD
∂x1D
+
∂πR
∂x1R
= 0⇔ 2κ1E[ϕv ]− 2η(X
1 − 1)(κ1(X1 − 2)− κ2X1)−X1(κ2(1− E[ϕv ]) + κ
1E[ϕv ]) = 0
This has one meaningful solution, which is
X1 =
√
(E[ϕv ]∆κ− η(6κ1 − 2κ2) + κ2)
2 + 16ηκ1(E[ϕv ]− 2η)∆κ + η(6κ
1 − 2κ2)− E[ϕv]∆κ− κ
2
4η∆κ
.
where ∆κ ≡ κ1 − κ2. Note that X1 increases in E[ϕv ]. For issue 1 to receive more total spending than
issue 2, we need X1 > 1, and otherwise issue 2 receives more spending. Thus, there is a threshold value
ϕ˜ that solves X1(E[ϕv ]) = 1 and such that if E[ϕv ] > ϕ˜ issue 1 dominates the campaign, and issue 2
dominates if E[ϕv ] < ϕ˜. This value is defined by√
(ϕ˜∆κ− η(6κ1 − 2κ2) + κ2)2 + 16ηκ1(ϕ˜− 2η)∆κ + η(6κ1 − 2κ2)− ϕ˜∆κ− κ2
4η∆κ
= 1⇔ ϕ˜ =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
.
If κ1 = κ2, ϕ˜ = 12 as before in Example 1. 
B.3 Example 3:
Under the assumption that
c(xi, θiv) =
θivf(x
i
D)
θivf(x
i
D) + (1− θ
i
v)f(x
i
R)
,
expected utility of candidates are
πD(x) = E
[
θ1vf(x
1
D)
θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
)
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
))
+
θ2vf(B−x
1
D)
θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
)))]
πR(x) = E
[
(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R)
θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
)
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
))
+
(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R)
θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
)))]
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From here I can calculate the first-order conditions:
∂πD(x)
∂x1
D
= E
[
θ1v(1−θ
1
v)f
′(x1
D
)f(x1
R
)
(θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
))2
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
))
−
θ2v(1−θ
2
v)f
′(B−x1
D
)f(B−x1
R
)
(θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
))2
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
)))
+ η
(
θ1vf(x
1
D)
θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
)
−
θ2vf(B−x
1
D)
θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
)
)]
∂πR(x)
∂x1
R
= E
[
θ1v(1−θ
1
v)f
′(x1R)f(x
1
D)
(θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
))2
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
))
−
θ2v(1−θ
2
v)f
′(B−x1R)f(B−x
1
D)
(θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
))2
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
2x1D + 2x
1
R − 2B
)))
− η
(
θ1vf(x
1
D)
θ1vf(x
1
D
)+(1−θ1v)f(x
1
R
)
−
θ2vf(B−x
1
D)
θ2vf(B−x
1
D
)+(1−θ2v)f(B−x
1
R
)
)]
We know from Proposition 4 that absent comparative advantages candidates spend the same on any given
issue, xiD = x
i
R. Using this and that E[θ
1
v ] = E[θ
2
v ], first-order conditions simplify to
∂πD(x)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi∧E[θ1v]=E[θ
2
v]
= E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
f ′(x1)
f(x1)
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
))
− θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
f ′(B−x1)
f(B−x1)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
)))
+ η
(
θ1v − θ
2
v
)]
= E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
f ′(x1)
f(x1)
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
))
− θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
f ′(B−x1)
f(B−x1)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
)))]
∂πR(x)
∂x1
R
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi∧E[θ1v]=E[θ
2
v]
= E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
f ′(x1)
f(x1)
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
))
− θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
f ′(B−x1)
f(B−x1)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
)))
− η
(
θ1v − θ
2
v
)]
= E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
f ′(x1)
f(x1)
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
))
− θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
f ′(B−x1)
f(B−x1)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
4x1 − 2B
)))]
When η is sufficiently ‘small,’ it follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that πj(x) is concave, and hence
there exists x¯ij ∈ (0, B) such that πj(x) increases in x
i
j for all x
i
j ∈ [0, x¯
i
j) and such that πj(x) decreases
in xij for all x
i
j ∈ (x¯
i
j , B]. Hence, when
∂πD(x)
∂x1D
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi=B
2
∧E[θ1v]=E[θ
2
v]
> 0,
in equilibrium we must have that x1 > B2 , while x
1 < B2 if
∂πD(x)
∂x1D
∣∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi=B
2
∧E[θ1v]=E[θ
2
v]
< 0.
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Using x1 = B2 in the simplified first-order condition, we find
∂πD(x)
∂x1
D
∣∣∣
xi
D
=xi
R
=xi=B
2
∧E[θ1v]=E[θ
2
v]
> 0
⇔ E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
f ′(B
2
)
f(B
2
)
(
ϕv + η
(
4B2 − 2B
))
− θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
f ′(B−B
2
)
f(B−B
2
)
(
1−
(
ϕv + η
(
4B2 − 2B
)))]
> 0
⇔ E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v) (ϕv)− θ
2
v(1− θ
2
v) (1− ϕv)
]
> 0⇔ E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v) (ϕv)
]
> E
[
θ2v(1− θ
2
v) (1− ϕv)
]
⇔ E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
]
E [(ϕv)] > E
[
θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
]
(1− E [ϕv])
⇔ E [ϕv] >
E[θ2v(1−θ2v)]
E[θ1v(1−θ
1
v)]+E[θ
2
v(1−θ
2
v)]
When this is the case, in equilibrium it must be that x1 > B2 ⇔ 2x
1 > B ⇔ X1 > B, and thus also
X1 > B > 2B−X1 = X2. Similarly, when E [ϕv ] <
E[θ2v(1−θ2v)]
E[θ1v(1−θ
1
v)]+E[θ
2
v(1−θ
2
v)]
it must be that X1 < B < X2,
and when E [ϕv] =
E[θ2v(1−θ2v)]
E[θ1v(1−θ
1
v)]+E[θ
2
v(1−θ
2
v)]
we have X1 = X2 = B. Moreover, as C1(θ1v) is a mean-preserving
spread of C2(θ2v),
E
[
θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
]
E [θ1v(1− θ
1
v)] + E [θ
2
v(1− θ
2
v)]
>
1
2
,
as
E
[
θ2v(1− θ
2
v)
]
= E
[
θ2v
]
− E
[
(θ2v)
2
]
= E
[
θ1v
]
− E
[
(θ2v)
2
]
> E
[
θ1v
]
− E
[
(θ1v)
2
]
= E
[
θ1v(1− θ
1
v)
]
.
Thus, persuasion is more effective on issue 2 and hence candidates have an incentive to campaign more
heavily on this issue unless issue 1 can compensate by being sufficiently more important. This proves the
statement from the example. 
References
Alonso, R. and Caˆmara, O. (2016). Persuading voters. The American Economic Review, 106(11):3590–
3605.
Amoro´s, P. and Puy, M. (2013). Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign? Public
Choice, 155(3-4):355–371.
Aragone`s, E., Castanheira, M., and Giani, M. (2015). Electoral competition through issue selection.
American Journal of Political Science, 59:71–90.
Arbour, B. (2014). Issue frame ownership: The partisan roots of campaign rhetoric. Political Communi-
cation, 31(4):604–627.
Ashworth, S. and Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2009). Elections with platform and valence competition. Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(1):191–216.
Balart, P., Casas, A., and Troumpounis, O. (2018). Technological changes, campaign spending, and
polarization. Technical report.
Bartels, L. M. (1992). The impact of electioneering in the united states. In butler, D. and Ranney,
A., editors, Electioneering A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change, pages 244–277. Oxford
Claredon Press.
30
Bartels, L. M. (2006). Priming and persuasion in presidential campaigns. In Brady, H. E. and Johnston,
R., editors, Capturing Campaign Effects, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 78–114. University of Michigan
Press.
Basu, C. and Knowles, M. (2018). The clarity incentive for issue engagement in campaigns. NICEP
Working Paper 2018-01.
Baye, M. R., Tian, G., and Zhou, J. (1993). Characterizations of the existence of equilibria in games with
discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. The Review of Economic Studies, 60(4):935–948.
Be´langer, E. and Meguid, B. M. (2008). Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice.
Electoral Studies, 27(3):477–491.
Borel, E. (1953). The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels. Econometrica,
21(1):97–100.
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968-1987. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 106:265–289.
Bouton, L., Castanheira, M., and Drazen, A. (2018). A theory of small campaign contributions. NBER
Working Paper 24413.
Boyer, P. C., Konrad, K. A., and Roberson, B. (2017). Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and
supermajorities. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 71:49 – 62.
Casas, A. (2018). Distributive politics with vote and turnout buying. American Political Science Review,
112(4):1111–1119.
Chowdhury, S. M., Kovenock, D., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). An experimental investigation of colonel
blotto games. Economic Theory, 52(3):833–861.
Dahm, M. and Porteiro, N. (2008). Side effects of campaign finance reform. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 6(5):1057–1077.
Damore, D. F. (2005). Issue convergence in presidential campaigns. Political Behavior, 27(1):71–97.
Denter, P., Dumav, M., and Ginzburg, B. (2019). Social connectivity, media bias, and correlation neglect.
Technical report.
Denter, P. and Sisak, D. (2015). Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition? Journal of Public
Economics, 130:1–14.
Dixit, A. K. (1987). Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review, 77(5):891–98.
Dolezal, M., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Mu¨ller, W. C., and Winkler, A. K. (2014). How parties compete for
votes: A test of saliency theory. European Journal of Political Research, 53(1):57–76.
Dragu, T. and Fan, X. (2016). An agenda-setting theory of electoral competition. The Journal of Politics,
78(4):1170–1183.
Egorov, G. (2015). Single issue campaigns and multi-dimensional politics. https://www.kellogg.
northwestern.edu/faculty/egorov/ftp/Single-Issue%20Campaigns.pdf.
Erikson, R. S. and Palfrey, T. R. (1998). Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simulta-
neous Equations Approach. The Journal of Politics, 60(2):355–373.
31
Erikson, R. S. and Palfrey, T. R. (2000). Equilibria in campaign spending games: Theory and data.
American Political Science Review, 94:595–609.
Fang, X., Singh, S., and Ahluwalia, R. (2007). An examination of different explanations for the mere
exposure effect. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(1):97–103.
Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., and Schachter, S. (1956). When Prophecy Fails. University of Minnesota
Press.
Franz, M. M. and Ridout, T. N. (2007). Does political advertising persuade? Political Behavior, 29(4):465–
491.
Franz, M. M. and Ridout, T. N. (2010). Political advertising and persuasion in the 2004 and 2008
presidential elections. American Politics Research, 38(2):303–329.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. The MIT Press.
Green, J. and Hobolt, S. B. (2008). Owning the issue agenda: Party strategies and vote choices in british
elections. Electoral Studies, 27(3):460 – 476.
Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. (2012). The War of Information. Review of Economic Studies, 79(2):707–734.
Herrera, H., Levine, D., and Martinelli, C. (2008). Policy platforms, campaign spending, and voter
participation. Journal of Public Economics, 3-4:501–513.
Hoffmann, M. and Rota-Graziosi, G. (2012). Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict
models. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1):168 – 184.
Hogg, M. A. and Vaughan, G. M. (2008). Social Psychology. Pearson Education Limited, 5 edition.
Hortala-Vallve, R. and Llorente-Saguer, A. (2012). Pure strategy nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel
blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(2):331–343.
Iaryczower, M. and Mattozzi, A. (2012). The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian
elections. Economic Theory, 49(3):591–619.
Iaryczower, M. and Mattozzi, A. (2013). On the nature of competition in alternative electoral systems.
The Journal of Politics, 75:743–756.
Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D. R. (1987). News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. University
of Chicago Press.
Kamenica, E. and Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6):2590–
2615.
Kang, T., Fowler, E. F., Franz, M. M., and Ridout, T. N. (2018). Issue consistency? comparing television
advertising, tweets, and e-mail in the 2014 senate campaigns. Political Communication, 35(1):32–49.
Kaplan, N., Park, D. K., and Ridout, T. N. (2006). Dialogue in american political campaigns? an
examination of issue convergence in candidate television advertising. American Journal of Political
Science, 50(3):724–736.
Klumpp, T. and Polborn, M. K. (2006). Primaries and the new hampshire effect. Journal of Public
Economics, 90(6-7):1073–1114.
32
Konrad, K. A. (2009). Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford University Press.
Kovenock, D. and Roberson, B. (2011). A blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information.
Economics Letters, 113(3):273–275.
Krasa, S. and Polborn, M. (2010). The binary policy model. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(2):661–688.
Laslier, J.-F. and Picard, N. (2002). Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition. Journal of Economic
Theory, 103(1):106–130.
Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political
Economy, 89(5):841–864.
Lee, J., Ahn, J.-H., and Park, B. (2015). The effect of repetition in internet banner ads and the moderating
role of animation. Computers in Human Behavior, 46:202 – 209.
Meirowitz, A. (2008). Electoral contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance. The Journal of
Politics, 70(03):681–699.
Meyer, T. M. and Wagner, M. (2016). Issue engagement in election campaigns the impact of electoral
incentives and organizational constraints. Political Science Research and Methods, 4(3):555–571.
Moon, W. G., Mackie, D. M., and Garcia Marques, T. (2009). The impact of repetition-induced familiarity
on agreement with weak and strong arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(1):32–
44.
Moorthy, S. and Hawkins, S. A. (2005). Advertising repetition and quality perception. Journal of Business
Research, 58(3):354 – 360. Special Section: Marketing Communications and Consumer Behavior.
Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. The
American Political Science Review, 87(4):856–869.
Petrocik, J. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. American Journal
of Political Science, 40(3):825–50.
Polborn, M. K. and Yi, D. T. (2006). Informative positive and negative campaigning. Quarterly Journal
of Political Science, 1:351–371.
Prato, C. and Wolton, S. (2018). Electoral imbalances and their consequences. The Journal of Politics,
80(4):1168–1182.
Riker, W. H. (1996). The Strategy of Rhetoric. Yale University Press.
Roberson, B. (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory, 29(1):1–24.
Serenko, A. and Bontis, N. (2011). What’s familiar is excellent: The impact of exposure effect on perceived
journal quality. Journal of Informetrics, 5(1):219–223.
Severin, W. and Tankard, J. (1997). Communication Theories. New York: Hastings House.
Shubik, M. and Weber, R. J. (1981). Systems defense games: Colonel blotto, command and control.
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 28(2):281–287.
Sigelman, L. and Buell, E. H. (2004). Avoidance or engagement? issue convergence in u.s. presidential
campaigns, 1960–2000. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4):650–661.
33
Skaperdas, S. (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory, 7(2):283–290.
Skaperdas, S. and Grofman, B. (1995). Modeling negative campaigning. The American Political Science
Review, 89(1):49–61.
Skaperdas, S. and Vaidya, S. (2012). Persuasion as a contest. Economic Theory, 51(2):465–486.
Smith, E. R. and Mackie, D. M. (2007). Social Psychology. Psychology Press, 3 edition.
Snyder, J. M. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica, 57(3):pp.
637–660.
Tom, G., Nelson, C., Srzentic, T., and King, R. (2007). Mere exposure and the endowment effect on
consumer decision making. The Journal of Psychology, 141(2):117–125.
Wagner, M. and Meyer, T. M. (2014). Which issues do parties emphasise? salience strategies and party
organisation in multiparty systems. West European Politics, 37(5):1019–1045.
Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming. Journal of Communication,
57(1):142–147.
Willnat, L. (1997). Agenda setting and priming: Conceptual links and differences. In Communication
and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory, page 51–66. Routledge.
Yoo, C. Y. (2008). Unconscious processing of web advertising: Effects on implicit memory, attitude
toward the brand, and consideration set. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 22(2):2 – 18.
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
9(2):1–27.
34
